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Absurd Dignity 
The Rebel and His Cause in Améry and Camus 
Ingrid L. Anderson 
Boston University 
I must confess I don’t know exactly what [human dignity] 
is…I don’t know if the person who is beaten by the police 
loses human dignity.  Yet I am certain that with the very 
first blow that descends on him he loses something we 
will perhaps temporarily call ‘trust in the world’…with 
the first blow from the policeman’s fist, against which 
there can be no defense and which no helping hand will 
ward off, a part of our life ends and it can never again be 
revived.1 
In “On the Necessity and Impossibility of Being a Jew,” Jean Améry admits 
that in Europe, “the degradation of the Jews was…identical with the death 
threat long before Auschwitz.  In this regard, Jean-Paul Sartre, already 
in…his book Anti-Semite and Jew, offered a few perceptions that are still valid 
today.”2 In no uncertain terms, Améry aligns his own project to “describe 
the…unchanging…condition” of the Reich’s victims with Sartre’s 1946 book 
on anti-Semitism, a philosophical gesture that was not uncommon for left-
leaning Jewish intellectuals after the war.  According to Robert Misrahi, who 
discusses at length what he calls Sartre’s “evident good will,” “his manifest 
care to render justice, and his desire, in the face of the Jews’ great suffering, 
to address himself to them,” Anti-Semite and Jew was primarily a “powerful 
affirmation of sympathy” for European Jews and, moreover, “an effective 
weapon against anti-Semitism.”3 Misrahi insists that French Jews were 
“astonished, even stunned for what we (Jews) were used to was hatred and 
contempt.”4 Sartre’s repeated assertions that the suffering of European 
Jewry was undeserved and unwarranted, are underscored by his declaration 
that Europe’s problem was not, after all, ‘the Jew’ but the anti-Semite, whose 
sadistic Manichaeism5 and profound fear of himself and his own instincts 
and responsibilities,6 had inverted European values so profoundly as to 
make genocide ethical.  And although Sartre repeatedly emphasizes his 
intention to analyze primarily the situation of French Jews, he does not fail 
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to connect European anti-Semitism with other forms of racialized hatred; 
‘the Jew’ is only a “pretext,” since “elsewhere [the anti-Semite’s] counterpart 
will make use of the Negro or the man of yellow skin” because anti-
Semitism, “in short, is fear of the human condition.”7 Given the profound 
radicalism of such declarations at the time, it is not a surprise that Améry 
confessed and enacted a deep affinity for Sartrean existentialism. And yet, 
despite Améry’s understandable eagerness to wave the Sartrean flag, 
Améry’s existentialism is less like Sartre’s, and, consciously or 
unconsciously, far more like that of Albert Camus.  Although Améry never 
mentions Camus in At the Mind’s Limits, Améry shares Camus’ reverence for 
rigorous analysis that simultaneously resists the kind of moral and political 
rigidity that often leads to a falsification of human experience and history.  
This is perhaps most evident in their overlapping treatments and 
understandings of human dignity and its solitary champion, the absurdist 
‘rebel.’ 
 In Améry’s preface to the 1977 reissue of At the Minds Limits, he asserts 
that, given the “horror” of the latter half of the twentieth century, a revised 
edition” of the original collection of essays “would be nothing but a trick, a 
journalistic tribute to actuality.” He is “unwilling to retract anything…said” 
in the first addition from 1966, and that he has “little to add to it.”8 Améry 
remarks that, after the fall of the Reich, the twentieth century appears to 
have produced more of the same, but Améry does not actually equate the 
crimes of the Third Reich with those committed by subsequent regimes, 
regimes that he agrees are also responsible for “invasions, aggressions, 
torture, [and] the destruction of man in his essence.”9 For Améry, despite the 
qualitative similarities between regimes that specialize in what Primo Levi 
called the “demolition of a man,” the philosophical nihilism and 
wholehearted brutality of the Reich are utterly and unmistakably distinct.  
That a nation of “Poets and Thinkers” became a people who “placed torture 
in their service…[and] even more fervently...were its servants”10 is for 
Améry inexplicable.  
The assumption that the Third Reich is historically unique is not 
unusual among Jewish intellectual responses to the profound destruction of 
World War II.  Richard Rubenstein, Emil Fackenheim, Irving Greenberg, 
Steven T. Katz, and many others have insisted—and often for different 
reasons—that the Holocaust is a unique event in human history.  And yet it 
is not as a religious or “cultural” Jew that Améry himself makes this 
assertion, but as a philosopher forced to accept the legally binding role of 
‘Jew’ in mid-twentieth century Europe. It is therefore as this kind of a ‘Jew’ 
that Améry approaches the problem of “radical Evil” and the Holocaust. 
First and foremost, Améry experiences the unsparing brutality of Nazi 
Germany as a self-defined humanist, intellectual, and rebel. “This Evil” that 
overtook mid-twentieth century Germany, he writes, “really is singular and 
irreducible in its total inner logic and its accursed rationality.”11  But Améry 
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also strongly suggests that “Hitler has gained a posthumous triumph.”12 
This triumph is arguably not best evidenced by the resurgence of Nazism in 
Europe, or even post 1945 recurrences of genocide in Europe and elsewhere. 
 Instead, it is the legacy of the Enlightenment that Améry fears the 
Third Reich and its offspring may have irretrievably mangled.  For Améry, 
the “concept of enlightenment must not be too restricted methodologically, 
for…it embraces more than logical deduction and empirical verification.”  
Rather, it is “the will and the ability to speculate phenomenologically, to 
empathize, to approach the limits of reason.”13 This harmonization of 
empathy and reason prevents doctrinal commitments and philosophical 
methodologies from limiting or even obliterating our innate empathy for our 
fellow man as our fellow and neighbor. “Only when we fulfill the law of 
enlightenment,” Améry muses, “and at the same time transcend it do we 
reach intellectual realms in which ratio does not lead to shallow 
rationalism.”14 Empathy is the ultimate enemy and first victim of this cold 
and shallow rationalism; nurtured by “restricted methodology” and enabled 
by what Améry bitingly terms “unchecked self-expansion,” the 
phenomenon that Emmanuel Levinas called “Hitlerism” reappears only 
somewhat transformed around the globe under different names and in 
different locations, led by slightly different men masquerading as demi-
gods. Like the epidemic that cripples Oran, the town beset with the Black 
Death in Camus’ 1946 novel, The Plague, these regimes are virulent strains of 
the Nazi original, and, for Améry and Camus, they are as much products of 
the Enlightenment as democracy.  What makes these plagues deadly is their 
form as much as their content; societies susceptible to these “illnesses” are 
constituted by populations unwilling to think too much, to do the work of 
bringing empathy into concert with the rational mind, to allow one faculty 
to limit and enhance the other. Such societies do not want to transcend 
systems; they want to adopt them. For Améry, this occurs with increasing 
ease and is perhaps Hitler’s most devastating legacy. 
 By 1951 when The Rebel was first published in France, Camus’ 
absurdism was already familiar to his readers. The Myth of Sisyphus 
appeared nearly ten years earlier in 1941, and is, along with The Stranger, 
considered the beginning of Camus’ formation of his own brand of 
absurdism.  Camus begins his 1951 treatise by defining absurdism as a 
viable political and philosophical approach to rebellion; but The Rebel is first 
and foremost an exploration and condemnation of the ubiquity of nihilism 
in the most powerful revolutionary doctrines of his time.  The mightiest tool 
in Camus’ arsenal is his carefully parsed analysis of “the rebel,” who at his 
best is not one of the same among many, but an individual, who feels his 
suffering has exceeded his endurance; the absurdist rebel’s validation of his 
own worth is in fact a validation of the worth of all men, and an implicit 
rejection of murder, and by extension, suicide.  Camus, an ardent leftist, 
insisted that true loyalty to communism required supporters to justify the 
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murder of innocents when committed for the sake of an imminent-but-
always-deferred global revolution. Camus argues convincingly that the 
revolutionary desire for a perfected, inevitable future, when coupled with 
ethical and philosophical bankruptcy, not only rationalizes the suspension of 
morality, but also ultimately necessitates it.  The rejection of what is 
eventually requires the elaboration of what ought to be—an admirable and 
definitive urge, which is native to human nature, and yet easily lead off 
course.  Camus writes,  
…as soon as a man takes refuge in doctrine, as soon as crime 
reasons about itself, it multiplies like reason itself and assumes all 
the aspects of syllogism. Once crime was as solitary as a cry of 
protest; now it is as universal as science. Yesterday it was put on 
trial; today, it determines the law.15 
Améry, too, identifies murderous nihilism as the defining trait of the most 
brutal twentieth century regimes.  This nihilism is carnivorous and 
cannibalistic at the same time that it is idealist.  While Améry observes that 
torture is the “essence” of the Reich, a regime unique in its original 
formation, the use of torture as the ultimate colonizer did not disappear 
from human politics and culture at Germany’s final collapse, but flourished: 
A world in which torture, destruction, and death triumph 
obviously cannot exist. But the [existential sadist] does not care 
about the continued existence of the world. On the contrary: he 
wants to nullify the world, by negating his fellow man, who also in 
an entirely specific sense is “hell” for him, he wants to recognize his 
own total sovereignty…the radical negation of the other, as the 
denial of the social principle and the reality principle…16  
Here, Améry identifies the desire for radical annihilation as a product of a 
regrettably rigid form of human rebellion; Camus and Améry describe the 
enactment of this revolutionary nihilism in strikingly similar terms.  Améry 
insists that his torturers knew that they had “expanded into the bodies of 
[their] fellow man and extinguished what was his spirit…”17 “With heart 
and soul,” Améry mourns,  
they went about their business, and the name of it was power, 
dominion over spirit and flesh, orgy of unchecked self-
expansion…there were moments when I felt a kind of admiration 
for the agonizing sovereignty they exercised over me. For is not the 
one who can reduce a person so entirely to a body and a 
whimpering prey of death a god, or at least a demigod?18  
The relation between the torturer and the tortured is primal and human, 
defined in large part by the struggle for sovereignty over self and other. In 
Camus’ analyses of “Romantic” and “Dandyist” rebels, he suggests that in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the human spirit of 
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rebellion falls victim to “extreme consequences of logic…an aristocracy of 
cynicism, and a desire for an apocalypse.”19 According to Camus, Romantic 
rebellion emphasizes the “powers of defiance and refusal…and forgets its 
positive content.”20 The result is a rejection of salvation itself, a phenomenon 
Camus explores most powerfully in his explication of Ivan from The Brothers 
Karamozov.  
 For Ivan the Romantic rebel, justice ranks above divinity; God is 
refuted in the name of morality, and denied on the principle of love for 
humanity. Ivan subsequently abandons any correlation between “suffering 
and truth.”  In an arguably logical but chilling deduction, Ivan finally 
concludes that “there is no possible salvation for a man of compassion…One 
step more,” Camus observes, “and from All or Nothing we arrive at Everyone 
or No One.”21 Thus Améry’s torturer wants to “nullify the world” by 
destroying his fellow man. What begins as man’s just “rebellion against his 
condition…and enlists the individual in the defense of a dignity common to 
all men”22 can forget itself, forget the origin of the revolt to which man has 
committed.  In the best moments of his rebellion, the rebel indeed asserts 
“this far and no more” with regard to the conditions in which he lives at the 
same time that he shouts yes from the rooftops to the dignity of every man.  
Camus writes, 
In order to exist, man must rebel, but rebellion itself must respect 
the limit it discovers in itself—a limit where minds meet and, in 
meeting, begin to exist…In absurdist experience, suffering is 
individual.  But from the moment when a rebellion begins, 
suffering is…a collective experience…human reality, in its entirety, 
suffers from the distance which separates it from the rest of the 
universe…In our daily trials, rebellion…is the first piece of 
evidence…It founds its first value on the whole human race. I 
rebel—therefore I exist.23 
When the rebel’s “categorical rejection of an intrusion that is considered 
intolerable” loses “conviction [in its] absolute right,”24 a value to which he 
must say yes, then the rebel becomes set on negation, a state of mind that 
justifies the destruction of the human solidarity in which rebellion is 
grounded.  “We have then, the right to say,” Camus insists, “that any 
rebellion which claims the right to deny or destroy this solidarity loses 
simultaneously its right to be called rebellion and becomes in reality an 
acquiescence in murder.”25 
 This rejection of murder so clearly stated in Camus’ corpus includes 
the rejection of capital punishment, an institution Camus abhorred.  In the 
years immediately following WWII, Camus was among the few public left 
wing figures to vehemently oppose capital punishment for French fascists 
and Nazi sympathizers, despite his disgust for fascism; his almost visceral 
reasons for categorically rejecting capital punishment in any and all 
I n g r i d  L .  A n d e r s o n  |  7 9  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.788 
circumstances—a point of view Sartre denounced and found politically 
suspect—are perhaps best outlined in The Rebel. Again, Camus argues that 
“revolt is an essential dimension” of mankind that can be understood in 
absurdist terms: “…absurdist analysis, in its most important deduction, 
finally condemns murder. The final conclusion of absurdist reasoning is...the 
repudiation of suicide and the acceptance of the desperate encounter 
between human inquiry and the silence of the universe.”26 Absurdism is an 
“experience to be lived through, a point of departure”27 that nonetheless 
insists upon living life, an act that is itself a value judgment.28 For Camus, 
rebellion itself constitutes both a declaration that “human life is the only 
good” as well as a rejection of chaos in favor of unity and order.  He writes: 
Rebellion cannot exist without the feeling that somewhere and 
somehow, one is right…[the rebel] demonstrates, with obstinacy, 
that there is something in him which “is worth while…” and which 
must be taken into consideration…he confronts an order of things 
which oppresses him [while insisting on the] right not to be 
oppressed beyond the limit that he can tolerate.29 
Camus’ rejection of the death penalty was not born of pacifism, although 
Camus had once identified with French pacifism.  Near the end of war when 
Camus was most active in the Resistance, he wrote in Lettres à un ami 
allemand that he “had accepted the sword now” and that “We have had to 
overcome our liking for man and the image that we created of a peaceful 
destiny…We needed to make a long detour and are very late.”30  
 Camus’ rejection of capital punishment under any and all 
circumstances marks the beginning of the parting of the ways between 
himself and Sartre. In 1945, less than a year after the liberation of Paris, 
known collaborator and writer Robert Brassilach was sentenced to death. A 
number of intellectuals signed a petition requesting that de Gaulle pardon 
Brasillach; among those who signed the petition, only two (François Mauriac 
and Jean Paulhan) were noted Resistance activists like Camus.  Novelist 
Marcel Aymé wrote to Camus requesting his support for the petition, which 
Camus granted, but not without anguish.  In a letter to Aymé, he wrote: 
I have always been horrified by death sentences and I 
decided…that I could not participate in one, even by abstraction…it 
is a scruple which I imagine will make Brasillach’s friends laugh a 
lot. And [if] Brasillach…is pardoned…I want this letter to tell him 
the following, from me: I did not add my signature to yours for his 
sake, nor for the writer, whom I consider as nothing at all, nor for 
the person, whom I despise with all the force that is in me.31  
Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and others refused to sign Brasillach’s petition. 
Beauvoir insisted that if she did anything at all to help a man like Brasillach, 
who openly supported murder and genocide, “she would deserve to have 
her friends “spit in her face.”” Brasillach had collaborated directly with the 
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Gestapo, and could not be spared. In the end, Brasillach was shot at the 
Fresnes Prison on February 3.32 
 The difference in opinion regarding the proper response to Brasillach’s 
crimes is indicative of the fundamental political and philosophical 
divergence that grew more distinct after 1945 between Sartre and Camus 
and the streams of leftist thought they represent.  Camus’ biographer, 
Olivier Todd speculates that Sartre’s support and increasing appetite for 
violence was “Manichean,” in part because Sartre was “not much involved 
with the Resistance, and his hardness toward the intellectual collaborators 
was inversely proportional to the risks he had run, while Camus, who had 
been more engaged, was less inflexible.”33 And unlike Sartre, Camus did not 
accept historical materialism, which he saw as the negation of freedom.  In 
his Carnets, Camus mused, “By what right can a Communist or a 
Christian…reproach me for being a pessimist?” As he wrote in a letter to a 
Belgian divinity student in late 1945, “I have too much taste for life and a 
feeling for the world to believe that all is nothingness…I do not believe that 
negation encompasses everything, I only believe that it is at the beginning of 
everything.”34 Even in 1938, when Camus reviewed Sartre’s Nausea for Alger 
Republicain, he was unconvinced by Sartre’s brand of existentialism, 
although he thought Sartre was brilliant. Regarding Sartre’s hero, 
Roquentin, Camus claimed that, “the error of a certain literature is to believe 
that life is tragic because it is miserable…To observe that life is absurd is not 
an end, but a beginning.”35 The absurdist rebel sees this beginning as 
promising, an engaging yes rather than a rigid and theory-driven no.  
 Although a more in depth analysis of Améry’s entanglement with 
Sartre’s work is called for than can be delivered here, At the Mind’s Limits 
and its deep-seated but often subdued riposte to Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew 
suggests a similar rejection of doctrinal rigidity and a prioritization of 
theories that are often unsupported by human realities.  Regarding Anti-
Semite and Jew, Misrahi asserts that Sartre’s perceived “negation of all 
[Jewish] particularity and the affirmation of their egality vis a vis all 
men…inspired Jewish respect for Sartre.”36  One can imagine Améry among 
this number.  Améry writes: 
I see myself as a boy at Christmas, plodding through a snow-
covered village to midnight mass; I don’t see myself in a 
synagogue…The picture of my father…did not show me a bearded 
Jewish sage, but rather a Tyrolean Imperial Rifleman in the uniform 
of the First World War. I was nineteen years old when I heard of 
the existence of the Yiddish language, although…I knew…that 
my…very mixed family was regarded by the neighbors as 
Jewish…37 
Améry did not hold dear, or even relate to, the markers of Jewishness to 
which Sartre so glibly refers in Anti-Semite and Jew.  Sartre certainly speaks to 
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experiences like Améry’s when he acknowledges that, for many, the word 
“Jew” is not known to them in any positive sense until it is imposed on them 
with hostility; but he simultaneously utilizes essentializing language to 
describe Jews and their responses to the conditions they face in twentieth 
century Europe.  The following passage, although perhaps soothing balm to 
the victims of genocide in that it does not defame them, nonetheless 
idealizes Jews and ignores the fact that these traits cannot possibly be 
applied to all Jews: 
The Jews are the mildest of men, passionately hostile to violence.  
That sweetness which they conserve even in the midst of the most 
atrocious persecution, that sense of justice and of reason which they 
put up as their sole defense against a hostile, brutal and unjust 
society is perhaps the best part of the message they bring to us and 
is the true mark of their greatness.38 
Here “the Jews” are not really human because they remain passive, even 
sweet, in the face of atrocities they suffer. Well-intended passages like these 
prompt Misrahi to assert that this doctrine of negation for which Sartre was 
so often lauded “does not exist in Sartre’s book.”  Rather, Misrahi insists, 
Sartre “criticized the synthesis but not the affirmation of the Jews’ “specific 
traits.”’39 Misrahi is correct. Sartre attributes many traits to Jews: reflective 
behavior, rationalism, denial of the body, lack of tact, a special relation to 
money, basic doubling of sensibility, and “non-metaphysical quietude.” 
Sartre presents these traits as “scattered” phenomenological data that is 
ultimately the “work of the Jew himself.” For Sartre, the anti-Semite’s 
mistake is to attribute these ‘real’ traits to every Jew on account of race.40  
Misrahi’s exact formulation is worth recounting here: 
…according to Sartre, the scattered traits, which were very real in 
Jews…certainly did not have a biological origin, but even so they 
constituted a specific Jewish personality.  How was this possible 
and how was this analysis presented as phenomenologically 
developed? It appeared that Sartre, in attempting to describe the 
psychological genesis of the Jewish being, had taken verity in what 
anti-Semites had said about Jews.41  
Misrahi argues that, for Sartre, the “inauthentic Jew” confers Jewish traits 
upon himself, while the “authentic” Jew has no specific traits and chooses 
between being a French national without Jewish characteristics, or a Zionist 
in Palestine.  Moreover, 
In refusing to define himself by the others’ reference, he became the 
negation of what the [anti-Semite] affirmed in him. The 
inauthenticity was thus the source of his Jewish character; but this 
source, even though it may have been the attitude of the Jew himself, 
was an alienated source because it was through the other (said 
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Sartre) and not through himself that the Jew amassed, one by one, 
the traits that characterized him.42 
This, then, is Sartre’s actual thesis, and not the one mistakenly attributed to 
him (that Jews do not possess “Jewish traits”). To what does Misrahi 
attribute Sartre’s inaccurate description of the Jewish condition in Europe?  
 According to Misrahi, who knew Sartre well both personally and 
professionally, Sartre’s errors were not due to “obscure feelings with regard 
to the Jews…In truth,” he insists, “his ambiguity reflected a radical 
opposition between Sartre’s political conception of history and history’s 
effective reality.”  Sartre’s ambiguity is due to “both his ignorance and his 
Marxist convictions.”43  As Sartre’s political convictions continue to solidify, 
his philosophical observations take shape in accordance with doctrinal 
demands.   
 Misrahi’s analysis of Sartre is in line with Camus’, at least with regard 
to Sartre’s shortcomings. As Camus wrote to his future wife, Francine, 
regarding what he called an increasingly religious fervor in both fascism and 
communism, “Philosophical thought only begins when we challenge the 
logic of clichés with rigor and honesty.”44 For Misrahi, this is precisely what 
is missing from Sartre’s analysis in Anti-Semite and Jew; according to Misrahi, 
Sartre’s political commitment to Marxism prevented him from engaging in 
rigorous philosophical enquiry about life as it is experienced. Sartre’s thinking 
ultimately misses the mark, in spite of his “good will,” primarily because of 
his desire to prove Hegelian Marxist theories of history. As Camus asserted 
about the rebel who has forgotten the origin of his rebellion, Sartre “has 
taken refuge in doctrine.” 
 Améry also finds a disconnection from the experiences of European 
Jews in Anti-Semite and Jew. Again, Améry explicitly praises Sartre’s 
phenomenological acuity in his study of the anti-Semite—and even, to a 
significant degree Sartre’s application of his theory of authenticity and 
inauthenticity45 to European Jews; yet parts of Améry’s At the Mind’s Limits 
contain a strong and unmistakable undercurrent that chastises Sartre’s 
naiveté and indicates that his politicized conceptions of reality often fail to 
accurately describe or even correctly address lived, human experience.  This 
is most pronounced in the essay “On the Impossibility and Necessity of 
Being a Jew.” Améry begins with a recollection of his first encounter with 
the Nuremberg Laws: 
[In] 1935…I was sitting over a newspaper in a Vienna 
coffeehouse…studying the Nuremberg Laws, which had been 
enacted in Germany.  I needed only to skim them [to] perceive that 
they applied to me.  Society, concretized in the National Socialist 
German state, which the world recognized as the legitimate 
representation of the German people, had just made me formally 
and beyond question a Jew, or rather it had given a new dimension 
I n g r i d  L .  A n d e r s o n  |  8 3  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.788 
to what I had already known earlier, but which at the time was of 
no great consequence to me, namely, that I was a Jew. 46 
After he read the Nuremberg Laws he was “no more Jewish than a half hour 
before…[except] that henceforth I was a quarry of Death…”47 
The image of Améry pouring over the newpaper in a Vienna 
coffeehouse reading his own death sentence is indescribably poignant; as 
Hannah Arendt asserts, his experience underscores the claim that we have 
no civil rights unless one is a citizen of a state that endows them upon us—
and moreover, will go to great lengths to protect them.  “I am certain that in 
that year,” Améry claims, “at that moment when I read the Laws, I did 
indeed already hear the death threat—better, the death sentence—and 
certainly no special sensitivity toward history was required for that.”48 With 
this pointed but subtle claim about the faculty of “sensitivity toward 
history” and its limited role in seeing what should have been obvious to 
every European about what would—sooner or later—be the plight of every 
European Jew, Améry begins his covert, impassioned dance with Sartre.   
Despite Sartre’s “unassailable points” about the anti-Semite, Améry 
contends: 
…in his short phenomenological sketch Sartre could not describe 
the total crushing force of antisemitism, a force that had brought 
the Jew to that point, quite aside from the fact that the great author 
himself [Sartre] probably did not comprehend it in its entire 
overwhelming might.49   
In other words, it takes no special sensitivity to or awareness of lived history 
to verify that the Jew had been delivered a death sentence in no uncertain 
terms; documentation of the Nazi view of Jews abounds.  Améry goes on to 
affirm that, given Sartre’s insufficient assessment of Jewish experience, it 
does take something more than the ability to understand this documentation 
to see clearly the Jews’ lived experience.  For Améry, Sartre’s assertions 
about the “inauthentic” Jew, that is “the Jew who has fallen victim to the 
myth of the “universal man”—subjugates himself, in his flight from Jewish 
fate, to the power of his oppressor,”50 indicate a disconnection from history 
as it is lived. Even Sartre’s extolment of the “authentic Jew” lacks genuine 
fidelity to human experience (who as Misrahi points out, is left with only 
two, very limited options for authenticity according to Sartre).  Améry is 
right; Sartre is missing the point. ‘The Jew’, whether he is “authentic” or 
“inauthentic,” was forced to experience the ramifications of Jewishness.  His 
behavior, his self-image, his political persuasion were irrelevant. 
…in the years of the Third Reich the Jew stood with his back to the 
wall, and it too was hostile. There was no way out. Because it was 
not only radical Nazis…who denied that we were worthy of being 
loved and thereby worthy of life.  All of Germany—but what am I 
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saying!—the whole world nodded its head in approval of the 
undertaking, even if here and there with a certain superficial regret. 
Thus,  
…it necessarily had to reach the point where Jews, whether 
authentic or not, whether secure in the illusion of God and a 
national hope, or assimilated, found within themselves no powers 
of resistance when their enemies burned the image from Streicher’s 
Stürmer into their skin…this…had little to do with the classical 
Jewish self-hatred…to oppose [social reality] with a self-evaluation 
based on other standards at times had to appear ridiculous or 
mad.51 
Améry rejects key aspects of Sartre’s phenomenology of ‘the Jew and his 
experience’ by delicately but firmly stating that to consider the matter as 
deeply as Sartre attempts to do, “one must have experienced it.”52 The entire 
essay is evocative of a dialogue between a student who quietly but 
resolutely rejects a fundamental claim of a beloved teacher, and certainly 
illustrates what Adrian West calls Améry’s “almost perversely intimate 
relationship” with Sartre’s texts.53  
 For Améry, as for Camus, the grave danger of reading human 
experience strictly through the lens of historical theory becomes most 
obvious regarding the question of human dignity, the question with which 
this essay’s examination begins.  Despite Améry’s reluctance to define 
dignity in immutable terms, it is nonetheless a central theme of his work, 
and the foot of his philosophical compass.  As part of his criticism of the 
limitations of Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew, he offers a formulation of 
‘dignity,’ something “first denied” Améry in 1935 and “officially withheld” 
from him until 1945.  He proposes that in the final reckoning, when we find 
ourselves legally and forcefully denied our ‘dignity,’ it becomes obvious that 
it cannot be defined solely through the logical deduction that dignity is both 
destroyed and restored via social contract; when we attempt to “convince 
society of [our] dignity by taking [our] fate upon [ourselves] and at the same 
time rising in revolt against it” we may re-acquire what was taken from us. 
54  
 At this point in Améry’s analysis, he shares aspects of Camus’ 
understanding of revolt and its relationship to human dignity and 
simultaneously moves away from it. Améry’s experience of dignity—and his 
attempts to retain it in the face of brutal, repeated, and inescapable 
dehumanization—could not be further from Sartre’s exhortations that 
persecuted Jews should resist “the constant temptation to consider that they 
are not like other men.”55 And although Sartre strongly states that, 
“authenticity manifests itself in revolt,”56 it is difficult to imagine that he had 
in mind the physical defiance that Améry recognizes as fundamental to his 
personhood in the camps. Améry insists regarding his struggle to regain 
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dignity there is “not much that can be said in [his] favor,” but that he did 
“finally relearn…what I and my kind often had forgotten and what was 
more crucial than the moral power to resist: to hit back.”57 Physical revolt is 
an important aspect of his claims about dignity, as is the necessity of the 
body in dignity’s reclamation.  Améry aptly relates an encounter with a kapo 
illustrating this: 
In Auschwitz [the prison foreman] once hit me in the face for a 
trifle; that was how he was used to dealing with all the Jews...At 
this moment—I felt it with piercing clarity—it was up to me to go a 
step further in my prolonged appeals case against society.  In open 
revolt I stuck Juszek in the face in turn.  My human dignity lay in 
this punch to his jaw—and that it was in the end I, the physically 
much weaker man who succumbed and was thrashed meant 
nothing to me. Painfully beaten, I was satisfied with 
myself…because I had grasped well that there are situations in life 
in which our body is our entire self and our entire fate.  I was my 
body and nothing else…my body, when tensed to strike was my 
physical and metaphysical destiny. In situations like mine, physical 
violence is the sole means for restoring a disjointed personality. In 
the punch, I was myself—and for myself and for my opponent. I 
gave concrete social form to my dignity by punching a human 
face.58 
Améry’s new understanding of dignity did not change after 1945.  He rejects 
the idea of pacifism as a viable political response to military (as Camus had 
done in 1943), and also the “deceptive peace” that follows the defeat of 
National Socialism.  “I had to recognize,” he avers, “even more clearly than 
in those days when physical revolt was at least possible that I was 
confronted with necessity and impossibility.”59 Finally, Améry admits, “the 
parentheses are now closed…I find myself in the postwar years, which no 
longer permitted any of us to react with violence to something that refused 
to reveal itself clearly to us.60 
 Améry’s experiences as a “Catastrophe Jew” are not explained or 
understood by means of any single religious, philosophical, or political 
theory. He was frequently misunderstood by Jewish intellectuals who 
contested his right to call himself a Jew simply because he identified with 
Jewishness solely as a Nazi victim.61 He agrees that perhaps his 
“consciousness of being…a Holocaust Jew” may be “compared to [Marx’s] 
class consciousness,” but not entirely.  He writes, 
I believe to have recognized that the most extreme expectations and 
demands directed at us are of a physical and social nature.  That 
such knowledge has made me unfit for profound and lofty 
speculation, I know.  It is my hope that it has better equipped me to 
see reality.62 
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Améry and Camus both grew increasingly suspicious of dogmatic politics 
after 1945, especially its frequent deification of universalizing theories about 
human experiences likely to belie them.  This shared suspicion was the 
result of personal experiences and lends their work conscientious lucidity 
and unabashed individualism.  Améry likely despaired Sartre’s inability to 
see that the plight of the European Jews clearly. But Sartre viewed human 
experience through a Hegelian lens; this affected the way he understood the 
world around him in profound ways. It seems unlikely that Sartre would 
have easily admitted that his own experiences as a white upper-class 
Frenchman limited his understanding of minority experience, and yet 
arguably, it did.  
 Améry’s most painful betrayal did not come from Sartre, however, but 
from what became of the left after 1945.  In his 1977 preface to At the Mind’s 
Limits, Améry deplores the menace of historical revisionism and other forms 
of politically inspired forgetfulness by identifying himself as a ‘rebel’: 
I rebel: against my past, against history, and against a present that 
places the incomprehensible in the cold storage of history and thus 
falsifies it in a revolting way. Nothing has healed, and what 
perhaps was already on the point of healing in 1964 is bursting 
open once again as an infected wound...63 
Here Améry articulates the final heartbreak: that his “natural enemies” 
(fascists, irrationalists, reactionaries) were no longer his worst enemies.  
“That today,” Améry writes, “I must stand up against my natural friends, 
the young men and women of the Left, is more than overtaxed “dialectics”: 
It is one of those bad farces of world history that make one doubt 
the sense of all historical occurrence and the end of despair…I 
was…not really surprised when I learned that at a rally for 
Palestinians in a large German city not only was 
“Zionism”…condemned as a global plague, but also…young 
antifascists made their…vigorous cry: “Death to the Jewish 
people.”64 
When Améry laments the year 1964, he likely refers to the appearance of 
French Holocaust denier Paul Rassinier’s 1964 book, The Drama of the 
European Jews. But why this particular book, written by this particular man? 
What is Rassinier’s part in Améry’s experience of betrayal? 
  Rassinier was a trained historian and a survivor of Buchenwald; but 
he also collaborated with fascists during the war at the same time that he 
was a committed Resistant; Rassinier identified as a hard leftist for decades, 
and served briefly as a socialist in the National Assembly.65 In his earliest 
writings, he primarily took issue with the representation of the Nazi camps 
in the testimonies of fellow survivors. For Rassinier, these memoirs 
“presented a distorted view of the phenomenon of the camps…[in that] they 
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painted an unnecessarily bleak picture.”66 Elhanan Yakira describes 
succinctly Rassinier’s concerns about representations of Nazi ideology and 
practice: 
According to Rassinier, the camps were merely another 
manifestation, however extreme…of the universal logic of 
exploitation and enslavement. Holding prisoner masses of people, 
who were on the verge of death while negating their dignity and 
humanity, was not part of a policy of destruction…but…was done 
according to the…logic of war…the Nazi camps were not 
the…expression of any particularly [uniquely] murderous 
philosophy…produced by the state or the enslavement or 
exploitation on which it depended.67 
Understood in this way, the Reich’s brutality fits neatly into the anticipated 
trajectory of history, and therefore is not an aberration but a fulfillment of 
certain interpretations of Hegelianism. Rassinier claims that gas chambers 
were not installed as tools of mass extermination of Jews and other minority 
groups.  While he admits that there were gas chambers in some camps, he 
argues that their location (near what he euphemistically calls the “sanitation 
facilities”) suggests they were not implements of mass murder, even though 
“some” inmates were indeed killed in them.68  
  “The connection between [collaborators and fascists] and Rassinier,” 
writes Yakira, created “an alliance of radical right and radical left” regarding 
“the denial of the Holocaust. Thus, by a kind of perverse osmosis, the basic 
themes of this denial crossed the boundary separating the two political 
camps, creating a shared ideology: anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, anti-
Israelism, anti-Communism, and pacifism.”69 Rassinier became increasingly 
right wing, but not before Holocaust denial had taken hold in certain 
streams of leftist thought. Rassinier’s pointedly titled The Drama of the 
European Jews, directly attacked Raul Hilberg’s watershed project, The 
Destruction of the European Jews published in 1961. In The Drama of the 
European Jews, Rassinier argues that there was never a Nazi policy of 
extermination, a Final Solution to the “Jewish Question.”  He takes Hilberg 
to task by questioning eyewitness accounts and again contends that the 
primary means of extermination were not technically feasible and therefore 
not responsible for the number of deaths attributed to it.    
 What do we make of Rassinier, whose theories are all the more 
astounding because he is a survivor of the camps who was submersed in the 
“concentrationary universe”? Anti-Semitism alone, despite the madness it 
can impart, does not account for Rassinier’s sustained efforts—he wrote 
twelve books, in fact—to prove, in spite of overwhelming evidence, that the 
genocide of European Jewry never took place. His work had an enormous 
impact. That he was a survivor of Buchenwald himself was damning 
evidence. Moreover, Rassinier was for many years a militant pacifist, and 
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strains of this core value can be teased out even from The Drama of European 
Jews that pained Améry so deeply. Rassinier’s political allegiances shifted 
ever further to the right, and yet his ideas remained revolutionary in the 
way that Camus describes in The Rebel: guided by rigidly defined doctrinal 
commitments, and always focused on the negation of what is for what, in the 
mind of the revolutionary rebel, ought to be.70   
 In later years, Zionism became a unique manifestation of evil for 
Rassinier. “Zionists from all over the world,” he snarled, “…have cried 
unceasingly…to publicize what they consider the true and apocalyptic 
proportions of the horror and torture suffered from Nazism, and thereby to 
increase the amount of reparations which the State of Israel receives from 
Germany.”71 According to doctrines Rassinier embraced, injuries committed 
against individual members or subgroups identified as exploiters are 
marginal when considered with broader, revolutionary goals in mind.  
Yakira aptly states, 
Both in Rassinier and in his followers on the radical French left, one 
can find this syndrome: one must not allow the crime that was 
committed at Auschwitz…to blind us to…the suffering of those 
who are truly exploited—The workers, people of the Third World, 
the Palestinians. What happened at Auschwitz was…just another 
instance among many of the true source of all crimes: colonialism, 
imperialism, capitalism, and Zionism.72  
Such thinking arguably makes it possible to remain largely indifferent to 
injustices not immediately accounted for by these phenomena.  
 Camus also experienced a perceived betrayal from his comrades on 
the left that informs The Rebel and its exhortation of rebellion that forgets its 
own commandments regarding the value of human life. The “purification” 
process immediately following the defeat of the Reich proved profoundly 
disappointing.  In August of 1945, he wrote in his Carnets, “the…process in 
France is already ruined, but, even worse, discredited.”73 Some court 
decisions regarding sentencing seemed incoherent; the pacifists who 
collaborated with fascist groups during the war further complicated matters. 
The war turned Camus away from pacifism for good.  He felt that “…[t]otal 
pacifism seems to me bad reasoning, and we now know that…it cannot 
[always] be upheld…”74 On the day of the German surrender, there were 
violent demonstrations in Algeria for its liberation from France. The French 
press focused almost exclusively on European casualties, but Camus wrote 
articles about the Algerian uprisings in Combat that attempted to shed light 
on the plight of Arab Algerians.  Algeria is not France, Camus insisted, and 
years of discrimination and racism left many Algerians disillusioned about 
assimilation with France. “The North African natives,” he wrote, “have 
distanced themselves from a democracy from which they see themselves as 
definitely excluded…they no longer wish to be French.”75 Camus’ interest in 
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the plight of native Algerians and his support for Algerian nationalism was 
complex, however.  He felt strongly that Algeria should maintain ties with 
France, but alter completely its position toward the population of Algeria. 
This made him, as Olivier Todd claims, a “solitary voice” on the matter.76 
 In 1946, The Plague is published, and Camus distances himself further 
and further from both communism and existentialism. When terrorist 
attacks broke out in Algeria in late 1954, Camus rejected François 
Mitterand’s declaration that “Algeria is France!” and the Front for National 
Liberation’s declarations against colonialism, asserting that these positions 
reflected profound oversimplification of life in Algeria. Only a small 
minority of European Algerians were “captains of industry.”  Most were 
working class or manual laborers like Camus’ family, and the standard of 
living for pieds noirs was twenty percent lower than in France.  Camus knew 
that the majority of European Algerians did not support equal rights for 
Muslim Algerians.  He denounced the profound racism of colonial Algerian 
society, and he worried about the plight of working class European 
Algerians should the revolution succeed. These “European” Algerians were 
Algerians, too. No revolutionary nationalist theory could change that. Only 
by addressing the plight of European Algerians in the event of a 
revolution—a question, too, of human rights—could the condition of all 
Algerians be practically addressed. “[O]bviously it’s easier to be 
anticolonialist in the bistros of Marseilles and Paris,” Camus quipped.77 
Peter Beaumont acknowledges that, “for those in the pro-independence 
movement he would never be forgiven for one remark whenever he is 
discussed in an Algerian context: “At this moment bombs are being planted 
in the trams in Algers. My mother could be on one of those trams. If that is 
justice, I prefer my mother.”78 Camus’ mother was nearly deaf and illiterate, 
and did not want to live in Paris because, she said, there were no Arabs in 
Paris. “The writer,” Camus muses, “becomes committed when he wants 
to.”79 
* 
On August 28, 1947, two years after the liberation of Auschwitz, Jackie 
Robinson signed with the Dodgers during a secret meeting with Branch 
Rickey. Robinson became the first player of African descent to play 
professional baseball in the twentieth century. “What I’m looking for is more 
than a great player,” Rickey told Robinson. “I am looking for a man that will 
take insults, take abuse—and have the guts not to fight back.” For Robinson, 
a civil rights activist before there was a civil rights movement, even the 
prospect of such pacifism was a violation. His wife Rachel wrote that his 
first two years with the Dodgers were “the most challenging…of his career. 
All of his instincts cried out for release to retaliate.”80 Améry, Camus, and 
Robinson, all from the same generation and embroiled in political and social 
tragedies beyond their control, articulate the value and source of human 
dignity in strikingly similar ways that defy the social norm.  Robinson 
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described his initial response to Rickey’s demand for two years of stoic 
silence in the face of denigration and even violence: 
All my life, I had believed in payback, retaliation; the most 
luxurious possession, the richest treasure anybody has is his 
personal dignity.  I had a question, and it was the age old one about 
whether or not to sell your birthright.  Could I turn the other 
cheek? I didn’t know how I would do it.  Yet I knew that I must.81 
While Améry in Brussels and Camus in Paris had through necessity come to 
understand human dignity in these terms, Robinson had been born to it; 
fighting back was in fact his “birthright.” Just as Améry must face postwar 
Europe without “punching a human face” to assert his dignity, Robinson 
must make the contribution for which he is best known by denying the 
reality of human dignity as he understood it, instead “selling it” for the price 
of admission for black players who would follow him.   
 Robinson also experienced what for him was a political betrayal that 
made him, like Améry and Camus, a “solitary voice” speaking from the eye 
of a political storm.  Robinson was an active New York Republican, which 
“meant supporting Nelson Rockefeller and Jacob Javitz, who supported the 
Civil Rights movement,” instead of Southern Democrats who were almost 
exclusively against it.82 Robinson belonged to the party of Lincoln; he 
endorsed Nixon for president in 1960 after discussions with John Kennedy 
indicated he was noncommittal on civil rights. When Kennedy, rather than 
Nixon made efforts to get Martin Luther King, Jr. released from prison, 
Robinson “withstood intense pressure—including from his wife Rachel—to 
follow King’s father in switching from Nixon to Kennedy...” As a result, he 
was denounced as an “Uncle Tom.”  In 1964, Robinson campaigned for Gov. 
Rockefeller, but Barry Goldwater was elected the party candidate. As a 
special delegate for Rockefeller at the Republican convention that year, an 
Alabama man “turned on [Robinson] menacingly when he cheered for 
Rockefeller aloud.”  The Alabaman’s wife grabbed her husband’s arm “and 
pulled him back.”  Robinson, free now to, in the words of Améry, “punch a 
human face,” cried “Turn him loose, lady, turn him loose!” He voted for 
Johnson that year. When Nixon made overtures to racist Dixie-crat Strom 
Thurmond of South Carolina, he again voted Democrat. Robinson confessed 
to a friend in March, 1968, “I want so much to be a part of and to love this 
country as I once did.”83 
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